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Rousseau and Law
monstrous logic
Rousseau’s “Law”
But, then, what is a law? So long as we continue to be satisfied
with attaching only metaphysical ideas to this word, we will
continue to reason without coming to any understanding.
—Rousseau, Social Contract (1983, 37)
It is never a mere antiquarian exercise to revisit Rousseau’s political
writing. Indeed, in times of political calm, one should probably not reread
Rousseau. If some sunny political day we chance to pick up his Second Dis-
course or his Social Contract, we meet with such blinding conceptual clar-
ity and so piercing a rhetoric that it is apt to push us beyond our threshold
of tolerance for enlightenment. Periods that lack a sense of emergency and
political danger always see Rousseau as over the top, vaguely paranoid, and
unnecessarily fierce. His texts, of course, laid the groundwork for modern
democracy and elaborated its most familiar formal features (sovereignty of
the people, separation of powers, the rule of law), but in contrast to other
theorists of the social compact (Locke, for example), Rousseau insistently
colored his reason for inducing the birth of posttheocratic (and post-
despotic) society with intense, emotional expressiveness. The fiery elo-
quence of his works is suspect, his imagery excessive, his rhetoric exorbi-
tant; and his conceptual discriminations are presented without the nuanced,
self-conscious ambiguity we are accustomed to in theorizing today.
Long before Nietzsche skewered Christianity, for example, Rousseau
condemned established state religions in his brief against theocratic orders
in Social Contract IV, viii, “On Religion.” Denouncing this “so-called oth-
erworldly kingdom [that] became . . . the most violent despotism in the
world” (Rousseau 1983, 98; all references are to this edition of this text),
Rousseau takes Christianity to task specifically because its adherents are
uniquely vulnerable to manipulation by the “falsely pious” largely because
they are supposed to love, and not be suspicious of, their neighbors.1 The
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former citizen of Calvin’s Geneva describes Christian citizenship as dual
(not of two countries, but of “this world” and “the next”—the “City of
God”), rendering Christians alternately society’s greatest victims (“en-
slaved”; 101), and its greatest tyrants2: Rousseau writes, “Christian law is
at bottom more injurious than it is useful for the strong constitution of the
state” (99), reasoning that
the homeland of the Christian is not of this world. He does his duty, it is true, but
he does it with a profound indifference toward the success or failure of his ef-
forts. . . . For the society to be peaceful and for harmony to be maintained, every
citizen without exception would have to be an equally good Christian. But if, un-
happily, there is a single ambitious man, a single hypocrite, a Cataline, for example,
or a Cromwell, he would undoubtedly gain the upper hand on his pious compatri-
ots. Once he has discovered by some ruse the art of deceiving them and of laying
hold of a part of the public authority, behold a man established in dignity! God wills
that he be respected. Soon, behold a power! God wills that he be obeyed. Does the
trustee of his power abuse it? He is the rod with which God punishes his children.
It would be against one’s conscience to expel the usurper. (100–101)
Passages like this make Rousseau almost unbearable to read, especially
if one attempts to regard him with a liberal, tolerant eye. Indeed, until re-
cently, I never paid much attention to this particular passage, which ap-
pears to have been written in the spirited heat of philosophe outrage, stan-
dard for the time, against the Church’s abuses (recall Voltaire’s “Ecrasez
l’infâme!”). And yet—now that religion is routinely invoked to justify en-
hanced political powers in our own pluralistic democracies as well as in
fundamentalist theocracies, Rousseau’s logic once again seems compelling,
even compulsory, reading. Political leaders in positions of authority in the
world’s most advanced democracy, the United States, now claim biblical
support for public policy decisions, and the question of separating theology
from reasons of state is hypothetical no more. Rousseau’s rhetoric, it turns
out, is more prescient and realistic, and less outlandishly paranoid, than it
first appears; we can no longer afford to consider it merely rhetorical.
It would surely be better if we never had to reopen our Rousseau, and in
times of only mild political dissatisfaction, we should forgo doing so if we
wish to maintain the illusion that the principles of representative democ-
racy he had so strong a role in conceiving have secured a permanent place
in our futures. Yet it is undeniable that democracy, a still-fledgling form if
you think about it, faces enormous challenges of both a theoretical and
practical sort today. The democratic principles Rousseau laid down, such as
the importance of the separation of powers, are now being severely tested
in the United States, the world’s leading democratic exemplar, and they con-
stantly endure subtle and overt challenges that play on nostalgia for me-
dieval forms of governance (corporatism and religion) that seem more pre-
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dictable. This is due in part to the historical fact that the popular sover-
eignty and the formal universality of the Law that Rousseau inaugurated
left us unprepared for the shocks that followed—the overt violence, wars,
and persecutions of the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries.
The strength of our institutions to withstand the pressures bred by their
own contradictions is in question at a practical level. Founding principles
taken literally pose unexpected dangers: proponents of “judicial restraint” in
the United States, for example, hope to limit the power of courts to redress
social imbalances, yet the triumph of such “restraint” (withdrawing the
courts from solving “social” problems) may undermine the judiciary’s own
balancing power within the structure of democratic governance. In the theo-
retical field, too, we find the renewed popularity of Carl Schmitt (Hitler’s po-
litical analyst sometimes called the theorist of the Third Reich) who made
eliminating the legislative branch of government a key component of his “di-
rect democracy”) seems symptomatic, an articulation of a “federalism” (in
the United States as in Carlo Bossi’s Italy) that is a programmatic antipathy
to parliamentary governance for the collected American and European states.
Western democracies have recently seen the partisan pressuring of legally
elected opponents, the physical intimidation of election boards, the disen-
franchising of ethnic and racial minorities—the list is long—going hand in
hand with economic domineering and other forms of bullying.
Our abysmal collective experience with modern forms of governance—
and with those who oppose them so radically—traumatically affects our
faith that democratic principles are safeguards against political excesses.
Dare we hope that democracy might still draw support against these excesses
from Rousseau’s own complex passion for it? Yes. If anyone realized that a
single concession to bullying, to strong-arming, and to “law-preserving”
violence (as Benjamin termed it) is a step in the wrong direction, it was
Rousseau. If anyone knew how trespassing against the law removes us in-
stantly to the flawed legal system of predemocracy, it was Rousseau. If any-
one opposed the abuse of law as a hidden apology for the right of the mighty,
it was Rousseau. He always directed his rhetoric against abuses of power, au-
thority, and the usurpation of “the name of the law.” To reread Rousseau is
thus to be strongly reminded that the liberating “formality” of the law he in-
augurated theoretically is not yet secured for everyone practically.
Times like these—when democratic commitments are wavering—make
the fiery rhetoric of Rousseau painfully relevant once more. To reread
Rousseau is timely now, for he insistently disturbs the bland assumption that
ours remains—in theory at least—the best of all possible democratic worlds.
Yet I do not happily find myself having to look again on his fearsome pages,
for my act of rereading is an index of the degree to which recent history has
shaken confidence in the elastic durability of the democratic system.
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Although readers usually overlook his astonishing prescience, Rousseau
actually predicted an amazing number of the social paroxysms that were to
follow him,3. More importantly, he furnished a remarkably subtle under-
standing of the mechanisms that produce social and political pathology. To
look to Rousseau for guidance is inevitably to be taken aback, amazed that
he foils our “Kantian” expectations of balanced formality (even though his
work introduced formal universality to politics and the law), amazed at the
high chimerical quotient to his writing that makes even the most sympa-
thetic reader cringe. He seems always to inject an unsettling element of fan-
tasy into his analyses—and often his writing appears expressly designed for
the sake of exposing this fantasy. In the very same places where Rousseau
offers his most lucid insights, we also find giants and monsters—the most
fantastical figures—springing up, as if Rousseau needed to include his own
malin génie as counterpoint to his reasoning. Still, in what follows, I wish
to argue that the inclusion of fantasy is intentional and systematic and that
by means of it, Rousseau conveys literarily that the “irrationalities” of the
past are never definitively shut down just because enlightened reason has
set to work. The exquisite logic of his concepts could never do this alone.
Rousseau forces, so to speak, the realization that fantasy always keeps a
hand in the Law.
Fantasy and the Law
Fantasy dominates in Rousseau’s Second Discourse: On the Origin of
Inequality Among Men (Rousseau 1983, originally published 1756). In this
text, Rousseau takes a subtle and richly suggestive panoramic tour of human
societies, showing them in epoch after epoch as trying (and perennially fail-
ing) to institute justice. A steady stream of hypothetico-historical societies,
depicted warts and all and examined for their benefits and failures, their
pains and pleasures, are also Rousseau’s “real” societies. That is, they are so-
cieties that have been instituted by purely human means, founded on man-
made laws without divine intervention. They have developed from an initial
zero condition of legislation (the state of nature) into fully elaborated legal
states. Although they are founded by purely human means, these states
nonetheless share a set of linked metaphysical beliefs: belief in the transcen-
dent origin of their laws (in Nature or God); belief that their foundational
laws manifest Natural and/or Divine Right or Order; and belief that “Jus-
tice” is the principle of the law’s institution. Rousseau demonstrates how,
given sufficient time, such states nonetheless invariably fail even in their own
terms. He cites one optimistic historical example after another (for example,
the Roman Republic) being brought low by the flawed foundation of its
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Laws, drowned by a torrent of injustice, disorder, and inhumanity that over-
whelms the supposedly well-founded state. Each fully law-bound civil soci-
ety he depicts, that is, spontaneously spawns, at its height, a monstrous
Thing—a gigantic mouth glutting itself on the very well-being of the state
that has been instituted by “just” laws. This oral monster is a “Despotism
[that] . . . gradually raising its hideous head . . . devour[s] everything it had
seen to be good and healthy in every part of the state” (159).
The eruption of monstrosity cannot be accounted for by any alleged
moral degeneracy in the state. Instead, Rousseau makes clear that the spec-
tral horror has arisen from the very heart of “do-good” civil society (founded
on Right, Justice, and Order). This monster of unparalleled proportions is a
new Leviathan come to gorge itself specifically on the “good” produced by a
wisely and justly administered (Hobbesian) state.
Rousseau’s whirlwind tour of social history and its monstrous apocalypse
in the Discourse is, of course, meant to illustrate how repressive and restitu-
tive laws alike inevitably (and utterly) fail to check the increasing concen-
tration of wealth and power in the hands of the despotic few at the expense
of the empty-handed many.4 Why? Human societies, Rousseau explains, are
first organized by informal mores, which naturally favor the better en-
dowed, the more powerful, and the richest. Laws, traditionally conceived,
are regarded as the means of compensating for the unevenness of the socie-
tal playing field that custom and mores have shaped. But to Rousseau, Laws
instituted to redress specific local inequities—say, an imbalance in the distri-
bution of social goods—are basically impotent, however well intentioned
they may be. Even when strongly bolstered by metaphysical rationales (like
“justice” and “fairness”), such laws never accomplish the actual instituting
of justice because, according to Rousseau, they are merely “metaphysical.”
They do little more than disguise what is a fundamentally flawed organiza-
tion for society: the simple division into haves and have-nots. Worse, such
laws lay the groundwork for even greater future injustice. The apocalyptic
monster is, then, no mere deus ex machina, nor is it simply a bugaboo cre-
ated to chastise moral turpitude and political ineptitude in an unworthy so-
ciety that has lost sight of its values. It is instead the cardinal symptom of a
disorder congenital in any order that has designed its laws around prevent-
ing the catastrophic return of despotic rule, and the war of all against all.
The impotence of “just” laws is due, that is, to the fact that disorder is the
one true principle on which the order that opposes disorder rests. Rousseau’s
monster is a warning: states that imagine themselves constituted by a princi-
ple of repressing disorder will always ultimately spawn monstrous disorder
“trampling underfoot the laws and the people . . . establishing itself on the
ruins of the republic.” This is not because of the purely human origins of so-
ciety, with its perfectly understandable human failures of equity and justice,
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but because society has unconsciously been constructed along an inhuman
fault line. Its essential, hidden reference is a Thinglike, fantasmatic Other,
psychically produced by a fundamentally rivalrous relation to one’s brothers.
“Metaphysical” social laws are devised to conceal with theological cover-ups
an elementary antagonism, but they cannot prevent its eventual return. A
monstrous despotism will invariably be unleashed upon the human society (a
“republic of citizens”) that is so faultily constructed. A “good” society (one
lulled into complacency as to its own rectitude) will suffer all the more cata-
strophically the greater its naive faith in the “goodness” of its laws and in the
love of its neighbors. For the “monster” is, of course, only the return of a so-
ciety’s own repressed: of its guilty, unconscious knowledge that the corner-
stone of civil society is an overwhelming, if concealed, inequality. The despot
(a dictator is one who emerges to meet a crisis) is merely one symptom of
civil society’s original criminality: the fact is that its “leading citizens” are
heirs to an original theft of others’ freedom and the usurpation of their
usufructs, their jouissance. Civil society’s confidence in the power of “just
laws” to attenuate, Rawlslike, the most egregious of a society’s problems
(through bans on “cruelty” or uneven distributions of socially produced
goods) is misplaced. In the end, such Laws prove to be themselves responsi-
ble for the shocking return of the absolute injustice and the absolute in-
equality that the “monster” represents.
In the Social Contract, Rousseau will offer an alternative to the regime
of brothers, the frères ennemis whose fantasmatic rivalry informs its every
law—a complete remodeling of the concept of Law itself. But first let us
look at the other fantasy figure in the Second Discourse: “Natural Man.”
Let us turn to him, but in doing so let us finally put to rest the confusion
over his real function, which is not to provide a “pure” alternative to des-
potism; for his Natural Man is not the Kantian “regulatory ideal” some
imagine him to be. On the contrary, Rousseau’s Natural Man is the func-
tional equivalent of his monster. In Rousseau’s hands, both figures are given
the structure of the unconscious fantasy—a primal fantasy of total enjoy-
ment—that has secretly motivated and shaped the entire elaboration of all
our social laws. True, Natural Man is painted in what seems a “positive”
light, in opposition to the gluttonous monster; yet once Rousseau sets le
sauvage into society, it becomes clear that each and every one of his seduc-
tive traits (seemingly so blessed in the state of Nature) becomes a horror
and a curse. He becomes a despotic menace to his fellow men. Indeed, the
fact that Rousseau can only infer the joy-filled Natural Man through the
laws enacted against him renders him the structural double of the tyranni-
cal monster.5 Rousseau’s image of an inhuman Thing erupting from soci-
ety’s bosom is the mirror image, that is, of the Natural Man who contains
the seeds of destruction of the Nature from whose bosom he erupts.
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Of course, it is these figures (signs of the eruption of unbarred jouis-
sance) that we recall most vividly from the Discourse—far more indeed
than we recall its complex and subtle argumentation. In Rousseau’s Second
Discourse, then, Law becomes inseparable from Letters. We shudder aes-
thetically at its terminator monster just as we shiver with aesthetic delight
at in its alluring originator, Natural Man—the two figures are irrevocably,
literarily twinned. Two conjoined figures of unlimited jouissance, monster
and Natural Man, both end up increasing the privative powers at work in
iniquitous social orders. They are catastrophic figures, conceptually inti-
mate with Rousseau’s systematic analysis of the deep structural engines
driving “development” (perfectibilité) within “civil society” (Freud’s “civi-
lization”/ “Kultur”).
Interestingly, Rousseau initially paints these motive forces of social de-
velopment with a recognizably human face: they result from a normal “hu-
man” passion—the desire to be seen, recognized, and honored by our fel-
lows. This is, he says, the great social spur:
I would note how much that universal desire for reputation, honors, and prefer-
ences, which devours us all, trains and compares our talents and strengths; how
much it excites and multiplies the passions; and, by making all men competitors, ri-
vals, or rather enemies, how many setbacks, successes and catastrophes of every sort
it causes every day, by making so many contenders run the same course. I would
show that it is to this ardor for making oneself the topic of conversation, to this
furor to distinguish oneself . . . that we owe what is best and worst among men, our
virtues and vices, our sciences and our errors, our conquerors and our philosophers,
that is to say, a multitude of bad things against a small number of good ones. Fi-
nally, I would prove that if one sees a handful of powerful and rich men at the
height of greatness and fortune while the mob grovels in obscurity and misery, it is
because the former prize the things they enjoy only to the extent that the others are
deprived of them; and because, without changing their position, they would cease
to be happy, if the people ceased to be miserable. (158)
In the common desire for recognition, however, Rousseau grasps not
only its human but also its inhuman quality. Isn’t the monster’s oral drive
derived from (and does it not also model) the very desire that “devours
us”—the scopic drive? Once the monster erupts, the natural “social” pas-
sion for recognition is profoundly called into question. His appearance re-
veals that a lurid fear underlies the dream of being a purely scopic
object:the fear of becoming an oral object instead. The mania for making
oneself seen, it turns out, is only a disguised expression of the unconscious
fear of being eaten by the other. The monster (gorging itself on everything)
is, after all, the fantasy of the most complete possible satisfaction (jouis-
sance) of the oral drive at your expense.
Rousseau pinpoints with acute psychological insight the fundamental
fantasy (the fear of being eaten) that underlies classical law. That he de-
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duces it from a simple narrative of human affairs is astonishing. His pene-
tration of the collective’s unconscious fantasy recasts social aggregates as
nothing more than a search for safety in numbers. Putting everyone under
surveillance is a bulwark against the disproportionate (monstrous) advan-
tage that the hidden other will take (Foucault’s dream, in a way). Rousseau
demonstrates, in short, that in classical notions, the basic structure of soci-
ety is asocial (antagonistic, rivalrous) in the extreme. To premise the Law of
society on the need to defend your own “goods” from your peers’ incur-
sions is to found Law on the fantasmatic fear that you will become the ob-
ject of enjoyment of an overwhelming, monstrous Other that is stubbornly,
inalterably opposed to you. The Law’s sole raison d’être becomes one of
sheltering you from the aggressivity of the other.
The asocial society that repressive/retributive laws represent is the
flawed product of this fantasy of oral enjoyment—and its producer as well.
For the fantasy’s social correlate is an actual economy in which the many
starve while the few enjoy to excess. Erecting laws on a fantasy of oral
jouissance inevitably leads to the same baleful outcome: the elementary so-
cial passion (the desire to be seen) ends by eating men up. Like Benjamin’s
angel of history, Rousseau piles up before us the wreckage that classical so-
cial “laws” have amassed and, like an uncanny Virgilian escort to the cir-
cles of Hell, he confronts us dramatically with that history’s “end”—the
apocalyptic monster that has secretly menaced it throughout.
Rousseau, of course, wants to put a stop to the eternal return of this mon-
strosity—eternal return because his Second Discourse shows that such an
“ending” turns out to be the same thing as society’s primal scene—return to
Natural Man. Indeed, the figure of a fantasmatic Despot has repeatedly dic-
tated, negatively and positively, the laws of social life (designed to free us
from him), and with every narrative of his demise, the cycle recommences.
Terminal despotic horror, like some James Cameron–Schwarzenegger Ter-
minator or Ridley Scott Alien, will “be back” to give birth to itself over and
over again—and Rousseau knows why. The very pains taken to subjugate
it—the ever-stricter laws against despotism’s return—ensure the recom-
mencement of its horrific reign.
The sole foundation of repressive law, it turns out, is the unarticulated
fantasy of the inescapable cannibal violence of the Other. It is, however a
singular violence. Rousseau’s fantasy monster is not yet the figure of the ur-
violence of Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” (the violence at the origin of
law and order); nor is it the figure of a collective guilt for such original vi-
olence (for example, against a scapegoat, as René Girard hypothesizes).
Rather, Rousseau places the deep engine of social drive in the destructive
fantasy itself.
This is surprising, because his social history-making in the Discourse had
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seemed historicist and anthropological, not analytic. Indeed, the Second Dis-
course is a virtual phenomenology of the spirit (of the laws) before the (He-
gelian) letter. It carefully unfolds the elementary laws of human association
while intentionally forcing us off their programmatic path. Rousseau’s
whirlwind tour of the “progress” of the spirit of the laws is designed not
only to speed us through history but to seduce us into losing our way, into
tarrying with whatever utopian moment it personally appeals to us to linger
over, before proceeding to the next stage or returning to “reality.” Rousseau,
that is, lures us into and inevitably forces us past our preferred utopias by
dissolving their picture-perfect moments into self-parody or worse—into
their own evil twins, clones that degrade and ruin their essence.
The sheer brilliance of Rousseau’s method must not be underrated. He
whisks us from alluring scenes of egalitarian, albeit isolated, presocial man
exercising his liberty to (and through) the successive social forms and po-
litical constructions that legally rob him of that liberty (for example, pas-
toral, agricultural, rural, urban, small town, republic, dictatorship, monar-
chy). If we imagine we can rest easy once Rousseau dialectically restores
man his freedom in civil form (as the citizen of a republic), we are mistaken.
For Rousseau snatches this new freedom from him once more as the Despot
returns, forcing us to realize that the irrationality of social order (even as
civil society) goes far deeper than its surface features announce.
Rousseau’s Discourse is, then, one of the first dialectical views of social
history ever formulated, and it is a dialectic that demands a monster for its
“squaring” or quadriplicitous formulation. Well before Freud and Lacan,
Rousseau stunningly articulated the unconscious fantasy that analysis is
able to precipitate out of an unconsciously distorted narrative, which is
here the ordinary tale of human affairs. Yet if Rousseau’s monster is the
equivalent of Freud’s Ur-Vater, the figure of a total enjoyment by the One
at the expense of the many, it differs from it as well. In Freud, it is the guilt
over murder of the mythic and unjust père-jouissant by his resentful sons
that inaugurates society as the Law (of incest, with its anthropological cor-
relates—bride exchange, organization into clans and families, and even so-
cial solidarity—they are all brothers in crime, etc.). The Discourse is com-
parable to the myth of the totemic father in Totem and Taboo, but inversely
so. For Freud’s omnipotent primal father is from the time before time—that
is, before society. Rousseau’s mythical monster of unfettered enjoyment has
a very specific temporality and historicity: it postdates the organization of
society and the institution of its Laws. Rousseau abducts the fantasy’s mon-
strous existence from a particular, repetitive patterning of failures in social
discourse. This patterning becomes visible only at the end of history (as it
is about to become prehistory again), and even then, it can be accessed as
fantasy only through its analytic construction (in Freud’s technical sense of
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the term)—that is, the sensitive reading, via tropic reversals and metonymic
associations, of a literally unspeakable structure.
What is the specific irrational element in the organization of society that
produces the pathological stuttering toward despotism that Rousseau seeks
to banish? The equation is simple: Our societies are structured around the
single principle of order. Order requires hierarchy; hierarchy inevitably be-
comes oppressive. Oppression leads to society’s ruin—the “return” of the
original deadly rivalry that “just” laws were supposed to neutralize. What is
less simple is Rousseau’s insight that the elaboration of social laws is being
driven by the fantasmatic fear of (or dream of?) a total jouissance on some
One’s part (Natural Man/Despot). So long as this fantasy remains unarticu-
lated, the specter of its own apocalyptic destruction (“everything . . . swal-
lowed up by the monster”) will haunt each and every society it secretly ani-
mates (II, 159). Again avant-la-lettre, the contours of Freud’s “primal scene”
and Lacan’s “fundamental fantasy” are the unconscious fantasy of an un-
bearable enjoyment on the Other’s part that commands all of the repetitious
failures in the life of the patient—in this case, society itself.
Law and Equality: From Second
Discourse to Social Contract
In fact, to a certain degree, fantasms 
cannot bear the revelation of speech.
—Lacan (1992, 80)
Fantasy enslaves the subject best. The task of the analyst is to exor-
cise the power of fantasy by articulating it. Rousseau does this in the Sec-
ond Discourse. But he also sets himself a different task in the Social Con-
tract: to recast the very definition of the Law. Rousseau saw Law as
framing the conditions of possibility (and impossibility) of acting in a soci-
ety of free subjects. By demarcating the line between two inherently incom-
patible regions of legality (freedom and order), he definitively framed—and
this really for the first time in history—a Law suited for a society that was
not composed of masters and slaves but of subjects mastered by nothing
but their own irrational attachments, including their subjective attachment
to a lack of freedom: “In their chains, [slaves] lose everything, even the de-
sire to escape. They love their servitude the way the companions of Ulysses
loved their degradation” (I, ii, 18–19).
This is why Rousseau creates so dystopian a fantasy at the “close” of so-
cial history in the Second Discourse. What he first presents as the progres-
sive line of social history proves to be only the long curve of the pathologi-
cally repeated failure of society itself. Until this moment in the Discourse,
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Rousseau simply seemed to be laying out an impressive array of recogniz-
ably human and very ordinary failings—competitiveness, envy, greed, and
narcissism—compiling a Voltairian sort of history of moeurs, a philosoph-
ically bemused study of the common extravagances of mankind. Rousseau’s
nontheological view makes men’s social traits their sole mark of distinction
from animals (and from Natural Man)—they are responsible for the worst
but also for the best in us. When society collapses, Rousseau pictures its de-
mise as the return of a state of Nature. But postsocial Nature has a horrifi-
cally intensified character. The naive state of nature, with all its sunny qual-
ities, returns at its darkest to display precisely the same despotic features
that once supposedly showed up only in the society of men: “Here every-
thing is returned solely to the law of the strongest, and consequently to a
new state of nature different from the one with which we began, in that the
one was the state of nature in its purity, and this last one is the fruit of an
excess of corruption. Moreover, there is so little difference between these
two states. . . .” (159). The immense irony is that it will have been these
very social traits, shaped by Laws that organize society so as to prevent
their return, that relaunch the reign of Nature with its accelerated, active
destruction of the social contract.
For Rousseau, “equality” is “natural” only when it is absolute—that is,
not relative. Absolute equality is impossible for any social being because
once an isolated being is inserted into society, its absoluteness necessarily be-
comes merely proportionate. What was absolute in isolation (liberty and
equality) becomes, in the group, a point of departure for a deadly rivalry, a
comparison with others: in other words, war. Classical theorists like Hobbes
believed that laws were instituted to quell or pacify the inevitable result of
the entry of solitaries into society, “war of all against all”. But Rousseau ar-
gues that laws founded on this premise have never really existed, and if they
had, they would not have solved the fundamental problem. Repressive laws
are their own incitement to transgression for the human subject; restitutive
laws are prone to similar abuse, although in a less obvious way. Long before
Nietzsche did, Rousseau found that our bravest historical attempts to make
justice into an a priori principle of the Law—its “spirit”—are pointless. The
real beneficiaries of such Laws are always those who know best to turn them
into instruments “more favorable” to them than to others (199). But make
no mistake: Rousseau’s fright-figure is not meant to encourage what conser-
vatives today call “deregulation,” anarchy, or even anomie. (He’s been ac-
cused of all these.) Rousseau’s monster simply functions as a signal to us that
the proliferating prohibitions of traditional law suggest we are putting the
accent in the wrong place where the Law is concerned.6
To Rousseau, repressive laws are only a symptom of some hidden, un-
checked despotism at work in the system. His reasoning is not that we
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should therefore do without laws. It is rather that we cannot count on laws
that are built on a faulty premise (that they are to prevent the war of all
against all) to remedy abuses inherent in any social order. After surveying
every type of civil society, it seems obvious to Rousseau that we cannot alter
the fundamental unfairness of social order unless we frame our laws differ-
ently, which is another way of saying that we have to conceive society on a
different model from that of regulating behavior. Yet how could he make it
so that the laws could address abuses, and so that the judgments based on
them could prevail in the face of indelibly brute force? Of what, in short,
does Rousseau’s revolution in the Law consist?
For Rousseau, the classical conception of Law is flawed in two ways.
First of all, it places a wrong-headed emphasis on social order as its goal.
Second, it puts metaphysical concepts in the place of basic principles. The
Second Discourse has also shown us a third aspect to his thinking: that the
Law must now recognize and take into account the factor of fantasy in its
own constitution.
Let me explain this last: when Rousseau’s despotic monster breaks the
poorly forged bonds of social life, it does so simply by staging society’s
deepest fantasy—its fundamental fear of the ravenous, rivalrous, omnipo-
tent other. The monster’s power to act the despot, however, is derived solely
from its remaining unrevealed. The despot is empowered only if he can
“push the fear buttons” of the subject, who is already driven by an uncon-
scious dread of his fellows.
Rousseau moves to defuse that fear not by preaching brotherly love, but
by simply articulating the fantasy—by showing how, at bottom, such fear
is unreasonable—an impossible basis for the Law. The monster’s return
demonstrates that any Law designed purposely to repress the aggression of
one against the other, even when framed in the strongest terms as an act of
justice, remains vulnerable to the would-be tyrant: let him transgress a sin-
gle law, or violate a single bond of love or friendship with impunity and the
Law in its totality falls. Rousseau, however, does recognize a “natural”
limit to tyranny, for even monstrous power eventually bends total mastery
itself to the breaking point:
Here is the final stage of inequality, and the extreme point that closes the circle and
touches the point from which we started. Here all private subjects . . . no longer
have any law other than the master’s will, nor the master any rule other than his
passions, the notions of good and the principles of justice again vanish. Here every-
thing is returned solely to the law of the strongest, and consequently to a new state
of nature different from the one with which we began, in that the one was the state
of nature in its purity, and this last one is the fruit of an excess of corruption. More-
over, there is so little difference between these two states, and the governmental con-
tract is so utterly dissolved by despotism, that the despot is master only as long as
he is the strongest. (159)
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At the Discourse’s end, Nature is crowned with the authority and power of
a Divinity who renders all men once again “equal”—which is to say equally
nil—in its eyes: “Here is the final stage of inequality, and the extreme point
that closes the circle and touches the point from which we started. Here all
private individuals become equals again, because they are nothing” (159).
Such a “natural” term to the reign of terror does not satisfy Rousseau, for
all its delicious irony. He wants more: he wants to jam the cyclical alterna-
tion of liberty-equality with despotic inequality by recasting the laws them-
selves, recasting indeed the very way we understand the essence of society
(what it is that draws us into association with each other). If society can no
longer be thought of as a shelter and a way of protecting us from others, it
must be reconceived as something of an entirely different nature. And its
laws must be made to respond to his insight that the classical laws of social
order instigate the very horrors they seek to repress. These horrors, after
all, do not explode as the result of natural violent urges but are the product
of fantasies of enjoyment and of privation (of and by others). For societies
so deeply shaped by fantasies of unlimited jouissance, the net effect of their
Laws can never be more than nil. Once Rousseau articulates (“constructs”)
their fundamental fantasy, however, he is free to devise an entirely new
strategy for the constitution of their laws.
In the Social Contract, therefore, Rousseau will split Law from Order
and make Justice Law’s object rather than its principle, a principle to be re-
made by detaching it from the spirit that has historically animated it—the
ghost or Geist of the Other’s obscene enjoyment. He will empty the Law of
this particular “pathological” content (the ineradicable hostility of the
other), and he will then relocate the legal principle outside its traditional
placement (in the metaphysical concepts of “justice,” “honor,” and “or-
der”). For Rousseau, Law alone becomes the a priori of the Law. In true
Enlightenment materialist fashion, that is, Rousseau reconstitutes the Law
as a conceptless and contentless universal: freedom.
Rousseau is distinguished from his contemporaries by his thoroughly re-
alistic sense of his subject. Very much like Descartes, his primary aim is that
of formulating a rational rather than a fantasmatic basis for the Law. He
nonetheless realizes that a rational acquisition of freedom will not end the
irrationalities of collective history. The fantasms of the Second Discourse
will not simply fade from view once the Social Contract builds a new stage
for world history. The monster of the old order returns even stronger, more
ravishing and more malignant than ever once it enters the obscure zone be-
tween its two deaths, and its second coming is its most dangerous appear-
ance. Rousseau warns: “Freedom can be acquired, but it can never be re-
covered” (II, viii, 385).
Rousseau articulates the fantasms underlying the ideal of social order in
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order to demystify and break definitively with western society’s faith in Di-
vine and Natural Law alike. But his practical analysis of human affairs
finds matters less clear-cut. Experientially, there is no simple human way to
distinguish the end of the reign of Nature from the beginning of the reign
of the gods. Indeed, no caesura marks their terminus. Rather, from a human
standpoint, Nature and the Divine stand Janus-faced, a horrid hybrid that
masks the real void in the Law framed as either natural or divine. Rousseau
marks his break only with a negative, for the important point is not only to
be “finally” free of such phantasms, but to preserve vigilantly our potential
to free ourselves of them again, once they make their inevitable return.7
He thus composes his Social Contract strictly from what he will call “the
[] human standpoint.” In the Contract, Rousseau distinguishes Natural and
Divine Law alike from the reign of Law as shaped by reason. Only a turn to
reason by the Law will disrupt the tragic dialectic of human society and its
vexed relation to enjoyment. The Law he conceives of is a law of freedom
that is effectively a freedom from the overwhelming, abusive power that Na-
ture and God represent, and a freedom to turn their power to positive human
advantage. Rousseau’s legal solution is psychologically sophisticated and in-
geniousand it gives no grounds for the unreasoning fear of the Other that has
driven society up to now, because each member is to made be equally lack-
ing in direct power over others. Rousseau is the first theorist to conceive of
the Law as fundamentally dependent on that factor considered the r negative
obstacle in all prior theories of social order—the human factor.
Law in the Social Contract
Securing Law from “the human standpoint” turns out, however, to
be no easy matter. A crucial section “On Law” in the Social Contract finds
Rousseau writing:
Whatever is good and in conformity with order is such by the nature of things and
independently of human conventions. All justice comes from God; he alone is its
source. But if we knew how to receive it from so exalted a source, we would have
no need for government or laws. Undoubtedly there is a universal justice emanating
from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, ought to be recipro-
cal. Considering things from a human standpoint, the lack of a natural sanction
causes the laws of justice to be without teeth among men. They do nothing but good
to the wicked and evil to the just, when the latter observes them in this dealings with
everyone, while no one observes them in their dealings with him. There must there-
fore be conventions and laws to unite rights and duties and to refer justice back to
its object. (36–37; my emphasis)
For Rousseau, laws have altered nature in order to produce what we know
as “human”. To refashion the laws of a society that has itself fashioned
253
S
N
L
cheng  3/1/04  5:29 PM  Page 253
m a c c a n n e l l
human life is to realize that “the effect would have to become the cause”
(40). The operation is radically impossible and yet radically necessary.
Where can we find the reason (and the imagination) required to frame the
laws of a social state if these only appear within a state whose laws and
imagination can be framed only because reason already exists there? To this
day, the Social Contract remains Rousseau’s most uncanny achievement,
designed as it is to pass between the impossible Scylla of founding law ex
nihilo and the Charybdis of the inescapable need to do so.
The Social Contract will found a state in which, as Althusser (1972) has
so brilliantly explained, the people as sovereign signs with itself its contract:
the party of the second part (with which the first party contracts) is “the
same” as the first and yet absolutely different from it. Moreover, the first
party that the second contracts with has no prior existence outside the con-
tract it signs with the second, which likewise has no prior existence—mate-
rial or metaphysical—before the contract is fully executed. The cornerstone
of all of Rousseau’s doctrine on Law is the argument that the sovereignty of
the people, self-legislation, and the assumption of legal authority have no
metaphysical foundation, no a priori existence; and that they emerge con-
substantial with their recognition of each other as the subjects of society:
that is, with the emergence of the Law. Rousseau had good reason to at-
tempt to secure the Law on these grounds. For what was the lesson of the
Second Discourse if not that a Law justified on purely metaphysical
grounds is ultimately shaped by fantasy and open to abusive misappropri-
ation? The Contract is Rousseau’s effort to configure Law and Right in an
entirely new and entirely rational way.
But in casting about for a rational basis for the Law, Rousseau finds him-
self limited by his own thorough realism regarding “the human standpoint.”
Unlike his classical predecessors, who saw society and its laws as a way of es-
caping the dread of the other, Rousseau knew from experience that society it-
self often plays the role of powerful oppressor. He knew that power-seekers
are ever alert to take advantage of one’s fear of one’s neighbors. (Recall how
the “law and order conservatives” in the Reagan years terrified United States
citizens with the specter of “crime”—which is just another way of saying
that you must fear your fellow man and look to us, the police, security
guards, and alarms, to guarantee your safety.) To discover a legal solution to
the problem of a society founded on fear requires more than reason alone. Ir-
rational fears are deeply rooted, and Rousseau’s lawgiver, to be effective, can-
not be a stranger to human passions. In his section “On the Legislator,”
Rousseau criticizes the classical view of the legislator as an alien God who
knows human passions but does not undergo them:
Discovering the rules of society best suited to nations would require a superior in-
telligence that beheld all the passions of men without feeling any of them; who had
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no affinity with our nature, yet knew it through and through; whose happiness is in-
dependent of us, yet who nevertheless was willing to concern himself with ours; fi-
nally, who, in the passage of time procures for himself a distant glory, being able to
labor in one age and find enjoyment in another. Gods would be needed to give men
laws. The same reasoning used by Caligula regarding matters of fact was used by
Plato regarding right in defining the civil or royal man. (II, vii, 38)
How does Rousseau extricate himself from the impasse in which one must
already “know men” in order to frame the constitution of their state from
“the human standpoint” without “altering” men (“I take men as they are,”
he says), as classical theories aim to do? This is exceedingly tricky. Rousseau
has said already that no state has ever yet been founded without recourse to
religion. Rousseau says that the legislator must have no office of “magis-
tracy or sovereignty” (39): his function has “nothing in common with the
dominion over men. . . . [H]e who has command over men must not have
command over laws” (39). As the lawgiver’s direct power over others must
be nil (that is, each human must have the same power as any other subject),
his legislative authority must come from a source other than his personal or
political dominance.
Rousseau also bars the would-be legislator from recourse to “force or
reasoning” (persuasive rhetoric), because his power of persuasion usurps
from the people the legislative power that lies exclusively with them. How-
ever, since before the institution of the Law, the people are as yet incapable
of reasoning (“the social spirit that ought to be the work of [the institution
of the law] would have to preside over the institution itself”; 40), the legis-
lator’s only recourse is to “an authority of a different order, which can com-
pel without violence and persuade without convincing” (40). This is where
religion, even with its penchant for hypocrisy, has played a traditional role
in forming the Law-based state:
This is what has always forced the fathers of nation to have recourse to the inter-
vention of heaven and to credit the gods with their own wisdom, so that the peo-
ples, subjected to the laws of the state as to those of nature and recognizing the
same power in the formation of man and of the city, might obey with liberty and
bear with docility the yoke of public felicity. . . . In the beginning stages of nations
[politics and religion each] serve as instrument of the other. (40–41)
In the long run, though, the realistic Rousseau concludes that the supposed
“interventions” of heaven admit that “any man can engrave stone tablets,
buy an oracle, or feign secret intercourse with some divinity.” The real au-
thority of the law comes only from the great soul of the legislator: “the Ju-
daic Law, which still exists, and that of the child of Ismael, which has ruled
half the world for ten centuries, still proclaim today the great men who
enunciated them” (40; my emphasis). We must accent the men, not the
“greatness,” in this phrase.
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Conclusion
The best summation of Rousseau’s revolution in the Law is contained
in his assertion from the Social Contract that he takes “men as they are and
laws as they might be” (17). This protocol reverses the classical search for
eternal laws to mould human character and guide human conduct on meta-
physical and religious grounds. Accepting men as “they are” means taking
men as they are already shaped by their sociality and already subjected to
society’s fundamental laws, which are fewer and yet broader than we imag-
ine. Rather than accenting the repression of the other’s demand to enjoy
your goods at your expense, this realistic law articulates precisely how fan-
tasy fears have motivated the best and most effective of traditional laws—
the Ten Commandments, for example, which enunciate these fantasies un-
der a sign of negation (“Thou shalt not” do what everyone already always
does, as Lacan notes). They draw, that is, an incredibly clear picture of the
real lives of real people, interested in their neighbor’s goods, wives, donkeys,
and all, and these laws do not fail to recognize and to mention these pas-
sions, albeit in the mode of negation. Rousseau’s model for a good law from
past times is one that will have taken our unspeakable passions, our fan-
tasies of enjoyment, and turned them into articulated desires. It will have
openly barred these desires, and yet openly bared them at the same time.
Fantasies articulated, even negatively, lead the way for the subjective fall of
the drives they spawn: “fantasms cannot bear the articulation of speech,” as
Lacan later put it.”
So much for “men as they are”; but what of the “laws as they might
be”? Their essence is entirely open: freedom. Rousseau rejects the principle
of Law as the framing of order (as in classical Aristotelian theory, that is,
according to ends defined prior to its institution—for example, justice, har-
mony). For him, it is instead a principle of freedom. Rousseau’s Law, that
is, is the first to embrace the idea of the Law as a canvas whose blankness
permits fantasy to dissimulate itself but also to articulate itself there.8 He
imagines a rational society founded on the absence of harassing fantasms
(fantômes), haunted by ghosts, but he acknowledges in the greatest possi-
ble detail their irrational persistence. For Rousseau, the generality of the
Law, its fundamental freedom, works by resisting the perennial temptation
to fill the void in Law with our own unconscious, unanalyzed fantasies.
Rousseau thus sits athwart the rational and the irrational, rendering his
sense of the energetic conflictual reality of social life different from the
“empty” universality that permeates Kant’s vision (even though Kant, too,
shoos away the Schwärmerai). Rousseau articulates the fundamental social
fantasy—the oral fantasy of being eaten by one’s fellows—with a view to ac-
knowledging it and withering its abusive hold over the conceptual basis of
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Law. Rousseau’s innovation strips the social canvas of particularity in favor
of what I term a negative universal,9 but the aim is not to purge society of its
bad moral content. To écarter tous les faits is less to restore original “purity”
than to hear with a third ear the deadly clamorings of fantasy that supports
its riotous desires. To read Rousseau as primitivist, that is, is to misread him
entirely, although this reading persists from Diderot to Pol Pot’s expunging
of Kampuchea’s cultural history in order to purify it. The Social Contract of-
fers not moral catharsis but the open possibility of a liberation from fantasy
(a hitherto unknown freedom) as the sole principle of the Law. It is not de-
signed to purge men of evil, but to fashion a symbolic place where their
ghosts are projected and potentially rejected, where their fantasy fears are
“to some degree” exposed to the withering articulations of logic. Rousseau
brings fantasy to the bar of symbolic Law—to speakability; it does not root
it out (impossible), but rather acknowledges its unwarranted, lethal power.
Rousseau thus steps past the naive “natural psychology” of warring dyads
underlying theories of Law from Aristotle to Hobbes into its first truly mod-
ernized conception.
Unconscious fantasy sets itself against the Rousseauian Law of freedom,
for it is a Law that liberates us from domination by unconscious fantasy.
Conservatives are constitutionally unable to believe in Rousseau’s kind of
law, for they remain fantasy-stricken in a structural way that resists all ef-
forts at cure.
Those who continue to appreciate Rousseau’s solution seem, sadly, to be
diminishing, leaving democracy disappointed.
notes
1. Compare Sigmund Freud’s remarks on the universal commandment to love
thy neighbor in Civilization and Its Discontents (Freud 1957, 109–10).
2. See Rousseau (II, 159).
3. See Rousseau (II, viii, 42).
4. In the year 2000, three-quarters of the world’s wealth was owned by fewer
than three hundred individuals. In Of Grammatology, Derrida chides Lévi-Strauss
for seeing the west’s treatment of nonliterate peoples as exploitation: what Lévi-
Strauss calls “enslavement can equally legitimately be called liberation” (Derrida
1976, 131). By failing to “Distinguish between hierarchization and domination, be-
tween political authority and exploitation. . . . [His tone] deliberately confounds
law and oppression. The idea of law and positive right . . . is determined by Lévi-
Strauss as constraint and enslavement. . . . A classical and coherent thesis, but here
advanced as self-evident, without opening the least bit of critical dialogue with the
holders of the other thesis, according to which the generality of the law is on the
contrary the condition of liberty in the city. No dialogue for example, with
Rousseau” (131).
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5. The influence of Spinoza on Rousseau is underrated. See Deleuze (1988,
18–19).
6. See Lacan (1992, 84). Rousseau acknowledges that prohibition incites trans-
gression (136) but looks to its deeper fantasmatic root: lethal rivalry with the other.
7. See Lacan (1992, 81).
8. Rousseau argued against slavery, ever mindful that he was formulating this
principle for societies (even democracies) whose members were not yet all legally
free. (In this regard, Rousseau’s critique of Aristotle’s defense of slavery in the So-
cial Contract, pt. I, ii, 18–19, is of capital importance to his position on Law.)
9. I frame the definition of a “negative universal” in MacCannell (2001, 29–50).
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